EDITORIAL

Abandoned Ordnance in Libya:
Threats to Civilians and
Recommended Responses
In a report released in August 2012, “Explosive Situation: Qaddafi’s Abandoned Weapons and the
Threat to Libya’s Civilians,” researchers from Harvard Law School’s International Human Rights
Clinic (IHRC) examined Libya’s abandoned ordnance problem and its humanitarian consequences
for the local population.1,2 Based on field and desk research, the report documents the threats these
weapons pose, analyzes steps to address them and offers recommendations to minimize civilian
harm. IHRC co-published the report with the Center for Civilians in Conflict (formerly CIVIC) and the
Center for American Progress. In this article, two of the report’s authors summarize its 2012 findings and recommendations.
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Stockpile Management

Since the end of the 2011 armed conflict, proper stockpile
management has been sorely lacking in Libya, but good practices are essential to minimizing the threats of abandoned
ordnance to the Libyan people.13,14 International organizations
and the national government’s Libyan Mine Action Center
(LMAC) have worked together to conduct surveys, and some
local authorities have agreed to measures to improve practices.15,16,17 Progress has been limited, however. Unstable and
inadequately secured weapons have remained in bombed ammunition storage areas, temporary storage facilities and militia shipping containers.
Poor stockpile management practices have abounded. Max
Dyck, the former U.N. Mine Action Service (UNMAS) program manager in Libya, reported in July 2012 that ammuniWeapons ranging from artillery shells to surface-to-air missiles spill out of an ammunition bunker near Zintan that was
bombed by NATO in 2011. These unstable and inadequately
secured weapons exemplify the danger posed to civilians by
Moammar Gadhafi’s abandoned ordnance months after the
end of the armed conflict.
Photo courtesy of Nicolette Boehland.

tion storage areas, littered with munitions that were kicked
out of bunkers by NATO bombings, had no real security.5 As
a result, civilians have had access to the weapons. Furthermore, local militias have used dangerous storage methods,
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Community clearance. Since the conflict, abandoned and
unexploded ordnance has contaminated homes, public buildings (such as schools and mosques) and farmland. Eager to
make their communities safer, some civilians have tried clearing areas without expert training or assistance, an activity
that endangers them and exacerbates the challenges of professional clearance.
Displays of mementos. Finally, war museums and private individuals have put weapons on display. The museum
in Misrata, located on the city’s main street, has exhibited
a large collection of weapons in a relatively haphazard way.
Demining organizations have worked to make such museums safe; however, the museums have undermined risk education efforts by normalizing the collection of weapons and
subsequently encouraging private displays, which deminers
cannot monitor.

Curious locals explore a tank yard in downtown Misrata where an Egyptian migrant was gathering scrap metal. Many civilians have been killed
or injured while harvesting scrap metal or explosives from weapons.
Photo courtesy of Bonnie Docherty.
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International NGOs have played a role in risk education
and worked closely with local risk educators. They have held
sessions raising awareness of the dangers of abandoned ordnance and other ERW, distributed brochures, set up regional
ERW-information hotlines, placed billboards on streets and
created radio messages.19,20 Handicap International and MAG
told the IHRC team that they have also cooperated with the
Ministry of Education to train school teachers to provide risk
education.21 These NGOs have received some additional assistance from LMAC (part of the Army Chief of Staff’s office)
and the Libyan Civil Defense.17,22
Risk educators have faced several challenges, including
dangerous attitudes toward weapons, particularly among
children; difficulties in reaching influential audiences (especially women, who play a key role in educating their families
about ERW risks); insufficient funding and the need to inA visitor looks at the weapons on display at a war museum
located on the main street in Misrata. Civilians may interpret
such public displays of munitions to mean it is safe to bring
weapons into their homes.
Photo courtesy of Anna Crowe.

crease capacity in Libyan civil society to undertake further
risk education activities.
As of July 2012, Libya had no established assistance program dedicated to the victims of abandoned weapons and
other ERW. However, the broader assistance program for war

should develop the national plan discussed above. In addition, it should take specific steps to reduce the humanitarian
threats caused by poor stockpile management. For example,
Libya should do the following:

• Allocate more resources to improving
stockpile practices

• Increase physical security at ammunition storage areas
• Prioritize coordination with militias to
move stockpiles out of populated areas

• Initiate a program for building technical expertise
within Libya

• Request international assistance to help put these
steps in place

•

Remedial Measures: Clearance, Risk Education
and Victim Assistance

To maximize civilian protection, a trio of remedial
measures—clearance, risk education and victim assistance—
should complement improvements in stockpile management.
After the conflict, UNMAS and international NGOs took

has helped those harmed by ERW.23
Libya, as the affected country, bears primary responsibility
for these remedial measures. In addition to developing a national plan, it should do the following:

• Increase its allocation of resources
• Promote capacity building and assist with the growth of
local civil society

• Help deminers obtain explosives for ERW destruction
and facilitate access to contaminated sites for clearance

• Ensure its victim assistance program follows international standards articulated in the Plan of Action
on Victim Assistance under Protocol V on ERW to
the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the
Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be
Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects24
International Cooperation
and Assistance

the lead on clearance efforts.18 These groups, however, have
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have had difficulty finding staff with technical expertise and

tion and assistance is critical to protecting civilians from the

sometimes have faced obstacles when accessing sites. Groups

threat of these weapons.

have also expressed concerns about the lack of local capacity
to take over future clearance activities.
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victims, which is run through the Libyan Ministry of Health,
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A shipping container that was part of a militia's urban stockpile exploded in
March 2012, setting off a chain reaction that littered a Dafniya neighborhood
with weapons. The painted message at the site reads, “Don’t come closer—
danger, death.”
Photo courtesy of Nicolette Boehland.
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